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Abstract—Business Process Modelling has acquired increasing
relevance in software development. Available notations, such as
BPMN, permit to describe activities of complex organisations.
On the one hand, this shortens the communication gap between
domain experts and IT specialists. On the other hand, this per-
mits to clarify the characteristics of software systems introduced
to provide automatic support for such activities. Nevertheless,
the lack of formal semantics hinders the automatic verification
of relevant properties.
This paper presents a novel verification framework for BPMN
2.0, called BProVe. It is based on an operational semantics,
implemented using MAUDE, devised to make the verification
general and effective. A complete tool chain, based on the
Eclipse modelling environment, allows for rigorous modelling
and analysis of Business Processes. The approach has been
validated using more than one thousand models available on a
publicly accessible repository. Besides showing the performance
of BProVe, this validation demonstrates its practical benefits in
identifying correctness issues in real models.
Index Terms—Business Processes, BPMN, Structural Opera-
tional Semantics, MAUDE, Software Verification.
I. INTRODUCTION
A Business Process (BP) model generally describes a set
of activities that an organisation should perform to fulfil a
specific business goal [1]. In addition it is possible to use such
kinds of models, in particular the so-called Collaborations, in
order to describe the coordination of different organisations
that cooperate to achieve a shared goal.
A BP model results from the synthesis of perspectives
related to different aspects of an organisation, and on the activ-
ities that should be performed [2]. Among these, the following
kinds of information are particularly relevant in order to derive
an effective BP model. The functional perspective describes
those units of work, also referred as activities, included in
a BP that may be needed to reach a particular objective.
The behavioral perspective specifies the behavior of the BP
defining the control flow relationships between the included
activities. The organisation perspective describes the different
actors that are involved in a BP and their message exchange.
Such modelling approach has not specifically emerged in
relation to the development of software systems. Instead, it
has initially acquired consensus as an effective way to reflect
on how an organisation operates, also in relation to possible
collaborations with others. On the other hand, such kind of
modelling activity constitutes an important thrust toward the
introduction of software systems. As it happens for any mod-
elling activity, the usage of a modelling notation to describe
the reality of interest permits to reduce the communication gap
between the different users of the model, so to keep the focus
just on the relevant aspects. Interestingly, possible different
users of BP models are domain experts and IT professionals.
Therefore in the last years BP modelling has emerged as
an effective approach in relation to requirements engineering
activities [3], [4], [5], [6], in particular for the development of
those software systems supporting the BP execution.
The relevance of BP modelling for software development is
probably even more evident if we consider the notations in-
spired by BP modelling that have been proposed, with different
levels of success, as executable languages. This is for instance
the case of service orchestrations expressed using the Web
Services Business Process Execution Language [7]. Another
common use of BP languages in driving complex software
systems concerns Process-Aware Information Systems, which
dynamically coordinate different resources (people, applica-
tions, and information sources) according to what is defined in
BP models. In summary, BP modelling has evolved to become
an effective way to specify software characteristics, and even
to program software systems. As a consequence, the relevance
of formal verification for BP models has become more and
more evident.
In the last years the Business Process Modeling Notation
(BPMN 2.0) [8], an Object Management Group (OMG) stan-
dard, emerged as one of the most accepted proposals to define
BP models. BPMN success comes from its versatility and
capability to represent BP for different purposes. The notation
acquired, at first, acceptance within business analysts and
operators. Successively, it has been more and more adopted
by IT specialists to lead the development and settlement of
IT systems supporting the execution of a specified process
model. This shift in the usage of the notation is particularly
relevant and poses the basis for our work. Indeed, OMG
does not provide a precise definition for the semantics of the
notation. The lack of a precise semantics may not represent
a big issue when the notation is used just for communication
purposes. Instead its adoption for shaping IT systems, and
even more importantly to apply model driven approaches to
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automatic code generation, does require the definition of a
precise semantics. To overcome such semantic gap, many
different proposals can be found in the literature. Use of
encodings and composition rules permitting to derive a Petri
Net inspired model is a quite popular approach to provide
the semantics of a BP (see, e.g., the seminal work in [9]). In
this case, the analysis will be conducted on the derived Petri
Net. Other approaches provide, instead, denotations of BPMN
elements with terms in a given process algebra (see, e.g., [10],
[11], [12]).
In this paper we provide an alternative verification frame-
work that is based on the definition of a native semantics
according to a Structural Operational Semantics (SOS) style
[13]. The framework, as detailed in the following, has some
distinctive characteristics:
• It does not make any assumption on the structural prop-
erties of the original model. Indeed, in order to make
the definition of semantic rules easier, some approaches
assume that models are defined according to good mod-
elling practices. Well-structuredness, which informally
asks for the usage of nested structures, is probably the
most common assumption. On the other hand, it is quite
common in practice that BP designers, in particular
less experienced ones, do not generally follow such a
recommendation. On the other hand some authors suggest
that modellers should not be constrained by structural
characteristics, so to freely represent the reality [14]. Thus
it is not uncommon to find models with an arbitrary
topology.
• It permits easy handling of BPMN elements that can have
non-local effects, and that are difficult to handle with
other approaches.
• It considers also BPMN communication elements, thus
dealing with BPMN Collaborations. Hence, it enables the
checking of issues possibly related to messages exchange.
• It makes easier to re-conduct the results of verification
activities to the elements of the original model.
The semantics has been concretely implemented using the
formal framework MAUDE [15]. This implementation has
been integrated with the MAUDE model checker, to allow the
automatic verification of properties of BPMN collaborations.
The resulting verification component has been wrapped as
a publicly available Web service, and a specific plug-in for
the Eclipse modelling environment has also been developed.
In particular, the resulting tool allows the user to select the
collaboration properties he wants to verify out of a predefined
list of intuitive behavioral properties expressed in natural
language, and then to automatically generate logical formulas
and to model check them over the BPMN model. This makes
transparent to the user the use of formal methods, by offer-
ing a modern integrated development environment, equipped
with verification facilities for BPMN models. The result is a
complete tool chain for BP modelling and verification, which
we called BProVe. The verification strategy has been also
extensively validated using models from an open repository
(http://bpmai.org/) [16], in order to derive its performance
characteristics in relation to BP properties (i.e., soundness
and safeness) relevant in software implementations. Notably,
we report on a large set of publicly available models that do
not satisfy such properties, witnessing the need of enriching
BPMN modelling with rigorous analysis techniques.
Summing up, the major contributions of this paper are:
1) an efficient implementation of a formal operational se-
mantics for BPMN within the MAUDE environment,
which enables the formal analysis of BPMN models;
2) a complete tool chain presenting a modelling environ-
ment and a service for the automatic verification of
properties over the designed BPMN models;
3) an extensive validation of the approach.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section II
provides an overview of BPMN. Section III discusses the main
features of the verification framework we propose, focusing on
its implementation and on the supported verification strategies.
Section IV provides an overview of the tool chain. Section V
illustrates the results of the validation experiments. Section VI
reviews related works mainly focusing on existing tools. Fi-
nally, Section VII concludes by also touching upon directions
for future work.
II. BACKGROUND NOTIONS
Having understood the rationale of considering Business
Process management on software development for IT systems,
in this section we introduce some basic notions. In particular,
we first discuss the phases of the BP life-cycle, and we
introduce BPMN as the reference language for modelling BP.
Then, we present relevant properties to be checked.
There are many proposals for the generic life-cycle of BPs,
deployed within IT infrastructures; here we refer to a slightly
revised version of the one proposed in [17]. It consists of four
phases: (i) Design and Modelling, where domain requirements
are collected to produce a model suitable to represent as-is or
to-be scenarios in organisations; (ii) Analysis, where syntactic,
structural and behavioral issues of the model are detected;
(iii) Enactment and Execution, where the model is deployed
based on the underlying IT infrastructure; (iv) Monitoring
and Improvement, where functional traces and non-functional
measures from the process execution are collected in order
to identify bottlenecks. In this paper we mainly concentrate
on the Design and Modelling and Analysis phases, which are
usually completed in an iterative method till reaching a stable
release of the model.
Focusing on Design and Modelling, several languages and
graphical notations have been proposed to represent process
models with differences in the level of formality. BPMN,
which has been standardised by OMG [8], is currently ac-
quiring a clear predominance thanks to: (i) its intuitive and
graphical notation that is accepted by industry and academia;
and (ii) the support provided by a wide spectrum of modelling
tools (currently more than 50, see http://www.bpmn.org for a
detailed list). Here we discuss the BPMN elements supported
by BProVe (see Fig. 1). Pools represent participants or or-
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Notation
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Fig. 1. BPMN Notation (an excerpt).
ganizations involved in the collaboration, and provide details
on internal process specifications and related elements. Pools
are drawn as rectangles. Tasks represent specific jobs to be
performed within a process. Tasks are drawn as rectangles
with rounded corners. Gateways manage the flow of a process
both for parallel activities and choices. Gateways are drawn
as diamonds and act as either join nodes (merging incoming
sequence edges) or split nodes (forking into outgoing sequence
edges). Different types of gateways are available: an XOR
gateway describes choices, an AND gateway enables parallel
execution flows, and an Event-Based gateway activates its
outgoing branches according to the taking place of catching
events. Events are used to represent something that can hap-
pen. An event can be a Start Event, representing the point from
which the process starts, an Intermediate Event representing
something that happens during process execution, or an End
Event representing the process termination. Events are drawn
as circles. We also refer to a particular type of end event,
the Terminate End Event, displayed by a thick circle with a
darkened circle inside; it stops and aborts the running process.
Connecting Edges connect process elements in the same or
different pools. Sequence Edge is a solid connector used to
specify the internal flow of the process, thus ordering elements
in the same pool, while Message Edge is a dashed connector
used to visualise communication flows between organisations.
Notably, we consider a subset of BPMN elements regularly
used to design process models in practice. Indeed, we have
selected such subset of BPMN elements by following a prag-
matic approach and only retained the features actually used
in practice (corresponding to less than 20% of its vocabulary
[18]). Therefore, even if we focus on a restricted number of
elements, we do not consider such design choice a major
limitation of the work. Also, we remark that, if necessary, we
might extend our framework to cover further elements. The
only element that could present some challenges is probably
the OR-join gateway. For such an element the BPMN standard
provides a quite articulated description in which the behavior
depends on the possibility that an upstream token could reach
or not one of the flows entering the gateway itself.
Given that we focus on properties for BP analysis, in
this paper we stress the importance of formal verification
to check behavioral correctness. In the experimental section
we consider the most relevant properties from the point of
view of implementing a software system based on a BP
model. In particular, we refer to soundness and safeness as
formally defined in [19], [9], and [2], and for which we
provide consistent LTL characterisations in Section III-C.
Informally, soundness can be described as the combination of
three basic characteristics concerning the dynamic behavior
of a process model: (i) Option to Complete, requiring that a
process instance can always complete, once started; (ii) Proper
Completion, requiring that there exists no running or enabled
activity for this instance when the process instance completes;
(iii) No dead activities, requiring that a process model does
not contain any dead activity, i.e., for each activity there exists
at least one producible trace which contains the activity. On
the other hand, safeness refers to the occurrence of no more
than one token at the same time along the same sequence
edge of a process instance. These properties naturally extend
to process collaborations, requiring that the process instances
of all involved organisations satisfy them.
The satisfaction of these properties is generally considered
a minimal guarantee to avoid unexpected behavior of a BP
model [17].
III. BPROVE FRAMEWORK
This section presents the proposed verification framework.
First, we summarise the distinctive aspects focusing on
BPMN modelling principles. Then, we exemplify the defined
Structural Operational Semantics and its implementation in
MAUDE. Finally, we discuss the properties we check.
A. Distinctive Aspects of the Proposed Framework
Our approach relies on a direct formalisation of BPMN
semantics that, as a main distinctive aspect, supports models
with an arbitrary topology. We are aware that this is not in
line with good modelling practices and recommendations to
use structuredness in modelling as a guideline to avoid errors
[20]. However, in the real-world modelling practice most BPs
designers do not follow such a guideline, as witnessed by a
study we carried out on the BPM Academic Initiative repos-
itory. In fact, by following an arbitrary topology, designers
are free to model the process according to the reality they
feel, without needing to provide structured models [14]. In
this way, the modelling activity results to be less complex
[21] and more expressive [22], [23]. Therefore, we believe that
considering models with an arbitrary topology will facilitate
our verification framework in having a real impact on the
development of process-aware systems, because all process
designers are supported in their usual modelling activities,
without imposing them any restriction or forcing them to
follow a specific modelling style. Nevertheless, given that we
consider a wider class of models, we can obviously verify
those BPs that comply to the structuredness recommendation.
Another relevant contribution comes from the use of a direct
formalisation of BPMN, avoiding typical problems given by
encodings, where the semantics is not given in terms of
features and constructs of the language, but in terms of low-
level details of their translations. More specifically, in these
approaches Petri Nets are often used as target language for
mapping BPMN [9]. While for the basic BPMN modelling
elements the encoding in Petri Nets is rather straightforward,
for others such encodings are quite difficult to define. For ex-
ample, the management of termination end events, permitting
to abort a running process, is usually not supported. This is due
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to the inherent complexity of managing non-local propagation
of tokens in Petri Nets, which instead is natively supported
by our semantics. Moreover, the main motivation to use Petri
Nets is the availability of already developed tools supporting
verification [24]. However, it is worth noticing that such tools
work well for the basic Petri Nets formalism, but they are not
anymore valid when considering extended versions of Petri
Nets needed to support all the BPMN features, such as the
management of task state evolution (e.g., enabling, running
and complete) or different types of tasks. Our semantics
provides an extensible framework that is able to potentially
support all the features of BPMN, as Structural Operational
Semantics permits to apply language extensions to cover
any other BPMN feature without affecting the verification
technique.
Another advantage of our framework, when compared to
approaches based on encodings, is that it makes the veri-
fication of BPMN models more effective. This is because
with the encodings the verification results refer to the low-
level implementation of the models, and may be difficult
to interpret them at BPMN level. On the other hand, our
direct semantics enables formal reasoning on model properties
at a level as close as possible to BPMN diagrams, so that
diagnostic information can be directly reported on the diagram
in a way that is understandable by process stakeholders. This
is especially useful when many parties need to properly and
quickly interact on the base of the models.
Concerning BP analysis, we provide a further novel con-
tribution since we reason at collaboration level. This enables
inter-organisational correctness which is still a challenge [25].
Thus, results of checking safeness and soundness with respect
to BPMN collaborations differ from results obtained through
encodings, which usually introduce a mapping at process level
and then compose the processes in a collaboration by means
of an inner transition [26]. In particular, differently from these
approaches and in accordance with the BPMN standard, we
do not impose any a-priori upper bound on the number of
pending messages, which however has to be finite in order to
perform the intended model checking analysis.
B. MAUDE Implementation of the Semantics
To practically enable verification of BPMN collaborations,
we implemented within the MAUDE environment [15] the
operational semantics for BPMN presented in [27]1. MAUDE
is an instantiation of rewriting logic [28] that has been used to
specify the formal semantics of a wide variety of formalisms
and languages [29], including C11 [30], [31], Java 1.4 [32],
and JavaScript ES5 [33].
Since MAUDE specifications are executable, we obtained
a formal interpreter for BPMN specifications. This enables
formal verification of BPMN collaborations, e.g., by means of
the MAUDE state space generator [15], or the MAUDE LTL
model checker [34].
1Our MAUDE implementation of the BPMN semantics is available at
http://pros.unicam.it/tools/bprove.
Fig. 2. Minimal Collaboration Example.
A detailed presentation would require to describe the seman-
tics from [27], and rewriting logic, which is out of the scope
of this paper. Rather, we summarise the main ideas used in
our implementation by exemplifying the BPMN syntax and
semantics that we implemented in MAUDE. We do this using
a simple example consisting of a pool containing a start event,
a task, and an end event. The example is depicted in Fig. 2,
while its MAUDE encoding is provided in Listing 1.
collaboration(
pool( "Customer" ,
proc(
start( enabled , "e1" . 0 )|
task( disabled , "e1" . 0 , "o1" . 0, "Check Offer")|
end( "o1" . 0 )
) , in: emptyMsgSet , out: emptyMsgSet ) ).
Listing 1. The MAUDE encoding of the collaboration in Fig. 2
As we can see from Listing 1, a collaboration is specified
using the operator collaboration, which takes a set of
pools as arguments (only one in Listing 1). A pool, defined
by means of the operator pool, takes as argument its name, a
BPMN process, and a set of incoming and outgoing messages
to communicate with other pools (both empty in Listing 1). A
BPMN process is specified using the operator proc, having
as arguments the set of BPMN elements (separated by |) that
compose it. The control flow is specified by the presence of
tokens in the process elements, which are allowed to act only
when enabled by tokens. In the example, we see that the start
element is enabled, meaning that it has a token in input
(denoted by the dot within the start event in Fig. 2), and hence
it is allowed to initiate the process. The topology of the process
is defined by the edges specified as arguments of the process
components. In the example, the start node (operator start)
is connected via sequence edge e1 to the input of the task
(operator task), whose output is in turn connected to the
end node (operator end) via sequence edge o1. The number
0 associated to the sequence edges specifies that the sequence
edges do not have a token associated yet. In MAUDE, the
semantics is specified in terms of rewriting rules which are
exhaustively applied by pattern matching on each generated
state, until no new state can be generated. A rewriting rule
has the following form:
c r l [Label] : Term-1 => Term-2 i f Condition(s) .
The keyword crl stands for conditional rewriting rule, whose
optional name is specified in the square brackets. The body
of the rule, Term-1 => Term-2, specifies that if Term-1
can be matched on part of a state, then a new state will be
obtained by: (i) removing the matched part from the state, and
(ii) adding Term-2 to the remaining part of the state. In the
example, one of such terms can be the entire collaboration,
a pool, a process, or a BPMN element. The if defines a
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guard that has to be satisfied by the considered state in order
to enable the application of the rule. In case no condition is
required, then the if clause is omitted, and the keyword rl
is used rather than crl.
c r l [SketchOfRuleForProcesses] :
el1 | RestOfProcess => el2 | RestOfProcess
i f el1 => el2 .
c r l [SketchOfRuleForPools] :
pool("Name",proc(proc1)) => pool("Name",proc(proc2))
i f proc1 => proc2 .
Listing 2. Sketch of rules for part of the semantics of processes and pools.
The BPMN semantics from [27] is multi-layer, in the sense
that it has rules for collaborations (layer 4) that depend on
rules for pools (layer 3), which in turns depend on rules
for processes (layer 2), triggered by rules for single BPMN
elements (layer 1). Roughly, the semantics is given in this
form: if a BPMN element el1 can evolve in an element
el2, then a process proc1 containing el1 can evolve in a
process proc2 containing el2, and similarly for the higher
layers, if necessary keeping into account interactions with
other processes or pools. This can be mimicked in MAUDE
using the condition if el1 => el2 shown in the abstract
sketch of rules for processes and pools provided in Listing 2.
For easiness of presentation, we just report simplified ver-
sions of the rewriting rules that are applied in order to let the
collaboration in Listing 1 evolve in the new collaboration (and
hence in the new state) in Listing 3, where the start element
consumed the input token propagating it to the sequence edge
e1, and consequently changed status from enabled to disabled.
The resulting state is depicted in Fig. 3.
Fig. 3. Minimal collaboration example after one step of execution.
collaboration(
pool( "Customer" ,
proc( start( disabled , "e1" . 1 ) |
task( disabled , "e1" . 1 , "o1" . 0, "Check Offer")|
end( "o1" . 0 )
) , in: emptyMsgSet , out: emptyMsgSet ) ) .
Listing 3. A successor state of Listing 1, corresponding to Fig. 3.
First of all, we need a rule specifying the semantics of
start elements, shown in Listing 4.
r l [E-Start] :
start( enabled , IEName . IEToken )
=> {tUpd(IEName . IEToken)}
start( disabled , IEName . IEToken + 1 ) .
Listing 4. Sketch of rule for task elements.
In the rule, start(enabled, IEName . IEToken)
is the element on which the rule acts. It is a start element
with status set to enabled. The symbols IEName and
IEToken are variables that can be matched with any edge
name and value of token, respectively. The rule establishes that
the matched start element will change status to disabled,
and will increase the counter of its outgoing sequence edge.
The term tUpd(IEName . IEToken) is a label contain-
ing information on the executed action which will be used
by the rules of the higher layers. Intuitively, in the example
the label is used to propagate the update on the token to all
occurrences of the sequence edge appearing in other BPMN
elements. To give a hint on the strict relationship between
the MAUDE implementation of the BPMN semantics and its
formal presentation given in [27], just for this rewriting rule
we report below the corresponding SOS rule:
(E-Start) e.n
+e.n- e.n+ 1
The one-to-one correspondence between the rewriting rule and
the SOS one is clear, despite the different notation (which we
do not explain here).
The rule for tasks triggers the execution of the rule for the
processes sketched in Listing 5. Roughly, such rule propagates
the changes from a single BPMN element to the entire process:
(i) the label is associated to the entire process rather than
to the single BPMN element; and (ii) the token counter
in all copies of the interested sequence edge occurring in
other BPMN elements is updated using the auxiliary func-
tion markingUpdate. We do not present in details the
markingUpdate, as it just scans all BPMN elements within
RestOfProcess. Note that this rule can be applied only in
case the execution of the BPMN element creates a label tUpd.
Other rules at the process level, not shown here, are provided
in order to handle other kinds of labels.
c r l [N-MarkingUpd] :
ProcElem1 | RestOfProcess
=> {tUpd(Edges1)}
ProcElem1’ | markingUpdate(RestOfProcess,tUpd(Edges1))
i f ProcElem1 => {tUpd(Edges1)}ProcElem1’ .
Listing 5. Sketch of rule for processes that propagates token updates.
Listing 6 shows how the dynamics from lower layers
propagate at pool level. Essentially, as discussed above, the
rule in Listing 6 establishes that if the process ProcElem1
of the pool can evolve in the new process ProcElem1’ by
creating label Action1’, then the entire pool evolves in a
new pool where ProcElem1 is substituted by ProcElem1’,
generating a new label collab(OrgName1, Action1’)
(recording the organisation name) to be considered at the level
of collaboration. The condition internal(Action1’) im-
poses that this rule handles only actions internal to the pool,
while actions that regard communications with other pools are
handled by other rules, omitted here.
c r l [C-Internal] :
pool(OrgName1,proc({Action1}ProcElem1),
in:inputMsgSet ,out:outputMsgSet)
=>{collab(OrgName1 , Action1’)}
pool(OrgName1,proc({Action1’}ProcElem1’),
in:inputMsgSet ,out:outputMsgSet)
i f ProcElem1 => {Action1’}ProcElem1’ ∧ internal(Action1’)
Listing 6. Sketch of rule for pools.
Finally, the rule for collaboration level shown in Listing 7
propagates the updates at the level of collaboration. As in the
case of the layer of pools exemplified in Listing 6, this rule
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focuses on action internal to the pool. Other rules are defined
to handle interactions between pools.
c r l [C-Interleaving] :
collaboration( Pool1 | Coll2 )
=> collaboration( Pool1’ | Coll2 )
i f Pool1 => {CollAction1} Pool1’∧ internal(CollAction1)
Listing 7. Sketch of rule for collaborations.
C. Verification
Verifying properties of BPMN collaborations is useful to
ensure their correct execution. Using our MAUDE implemen-
tation of BPMN we can verify those properties that can be
expressed in terms of LTL formulas [35], successively checked
using the MAUDE LTL model checker [34].
The formulas we show here are obtained as composition of
the following basic cases:
• <> φ, where the operator <> (corresponding to the LTL
operator F ) is used to verify if a formula φ eventually
holds. That is, in any possible execution path we always
encounter a state where φ holds.
• [] φ, where the operator [] (corresponding to the LTL
operator G) is used to verify if a formula φ globally
holds. That is, φ holds in all states encountered in any
possible execution path.
• φ -> ϕ, where the operator -> is the standard boolean
implication.
In order to verify the properties mentioned above of a
model, say BPmodel, we have to execute the following
MAUDE command:
red modelCheck(BPmodel,φ) .
Listing 8. MAUDE command to run LTL model checking.
In our tool we focus on verifying the Soundness and
Safeness properties of BPMN models. In the rest of the section
we exemplify the formulas we used to study those properties.
As we know from Section II, the Soundness property can be
encoded in terms of three simpler ones: Option To Complete,
Proper Completion and No Dead Activities. Notably, as these
properties refer to a single pool, they have to be checked
for each pool in the collaboration. Anyway, such checks are
carried out over the overall collaboration model, in order to
take into account the message exchange among organisations.
Option To Complete. This property relies in turn on two
properties: aPoolCanStart and aPoolEnds. The former checks
if a token is present in a start element of a given pool. Instead,
the latter checks if a token is present in an end element of a
given pool, implying that the pool completed the execution.
The property is encoded has shown in Listing 9.
[](aPoolCanStart(poolName) -> <>aPoolEnds(poolName))
Listing 9. Property Option to Complete.
The above formula verifies that from any state ([]) in
which the pool can start (aPoolCanStart(poolName)),
we eventually reach a state (<>) where the pool com-
pletes its execution (aPoolEnds(poolName)). Interest-
ingly, this formula adheres to the well-known response
property pattern (see, e.g., http://patterns.projects.cs.ksu.edu/
documentation/patterns/response.shtml)
Proper Completion. This property checks that a pool always
correctly completes its execution. In particular, we check that
whenever a token reaches the end of the pool, then no other
token remains unused within the pool. To verify this property
we rely on two properties: aPoolEnds and NoDanglingToken.
The latter checks that the pool does not contain other tokens.
The property is encoded has shown in Listing 10.
[](aPoolEnds(poolName) -> NoDandlingToken(poolName)).
Listing 10. Property Proper Completion.
In words we verify that whenever a pool completes its execu-
tion, then no other token remains in the pool. Differently from
Listing 9, now the right-hand side of the implication does not
have a <> operator because we check the NoDanglingToken
condition on the same state that satisfied aPoolEnds. No
Dead Activities. This property relies on the verification of the
condition aTaskRunning, which establishes that a given task
can be set, at least once, in the status Running (meaning that
the task is currently being executed). If this property holds
for all the tasks in the model, then the model has No Dead
Activities. The property is encoded as shown in Listing 11.
<> aTaskRunning(taskName) .
Listing 11. Property No Dead Activities.
Safeness. This property can be encoded in terms of one
single condition only, safeState, as shown in Listing 12.
[] safeState(poolName) .
Listing 12. Property Safeness.
As shown in Listing 13, safeState evaluates to true in states
that satify the auxiliary function noMultipleToken, which ver-
ifies that on each sequence edge there is at most one token.
ceq collaboration(
pool( Org1Name ,
proc( {Action1}ProcElements1 ),
in: inputMsgSet ,out: outputMsgSet ) |
Coll1 ) |= safeness(Org1Name) = true
i f noMultipleToken(ProcElements1) = true .
Listing 13. Safeness Implementation
IV. BPROVE TOOL CHAIN
To better clarify the contribution of our Tool Chain, we
report in the Sequence Diagram of Fig. 4 a typical usage sce-
nario, while the interested reader can find further information
on the tool and its usage in [36]. The considered scenario
shows all the interactions between a User and the tool chain
main components.
The user, after designing a BPMN model with the Modelling
Environment, requests a check on the designed model (see
screenshot in Fig. 5). Then, the Modelling Environment sends
a request to the BProVe WebService asking for a parsing of the
BPMN model. The BProVe WebService evaluates the model,
verifying that in the model are not present BPMN elements
that cannot be handled by the considered BPMN operational
semantics. Based on the evaluation result, the sequence of
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interaction may differ. This is represented in the Sequence
Diagram by an alternative block (delimited by the horizontal
dashed line).
The part labeled “Ok” contains all the interactions that
normally occur if the result of the Model Evaluation is
positive, which means that the BPMN model contains only
elements that are supported by our framework. In this case, the
model is parsed and sent back to the Modelling Environment
which asks the User to specify a property he/she wants to
verify over the model. After the User specifies a property,
the Modelling Environment sends a verification request to
the BProVe WebService, which transforms the property in
an LTL formula compatible with the MAUDE LTL model
checker and it passes the property together with the models
to the BProVe Framework. This latter component starts an
instance of MAUDE loaded with the LTL MAUDE model
checker and the MAUDE modules containing the semantic
rules. Then, it verifies the property and sends the result back
to the BProVe WebService, which properly formats the result
and sends it to the Modelling Environment that will display it
to the User. When the property verification result is negative,
it means that the property is not verified over that BPMN
model; if a counterexample is present, this is shown to the
user. This information is visualised directly on the BPMN
model (see the elements coloured in magenta in the screenshot
shown in Fig. 5), thus facilitating the interpretation of the
verification result to users, especially for those not familiar
with the underlying formal verification technique. Instead, if
the property verification result is positive, it means that the
property is verified and a message stating this is displayed to
the User.
The part labeled “Ko” contains the interactions that occur
if the model presents elements that are not supported by our
framework. In this case, the BProVe WebService informs the
Modelling Environment on the model ineligibility for parsing,
and, in turn, the Modelling Environment informs the User.
V. VALIDATION
This section presents the experimentation we ran using
our BProVe verification framework. The set-up and the re-
sults of the performed experiments are described below. The
experiments can be replicated using a VirtualBox virtual
machine containing an installation of our framework, available
at http://pros.unicam.it/tools/bprove. Our validation has been
shaped considering the following research questions:
• Are soundness and safeness already correctly handled
by modellers, or instead modellers do release models
violating such properties?
• Can BProVe actually and effectively support modellers in
the verification of their models, specifically in relation to
soundness and safeness properties?
A. Experimentation Set-Up
In order to validate our verification framework against real-
word processes, we consider BPMN collaboration models
provided by the BPM Academic Initiative (http://bpmai.org/)
[16]. This is a collection including almost thirty thousand
models codified using various process modelling languages.
We chose it because it is particularly suited to investigate
modelling practices thanks to its heterogeneity [37].
The raw dataset consists of 16 032 BPMN models, but we
restricted to the latest revision of the models with 100% of
connectedness2. A model without this level of connectedness
includes disconnected fragments, which typically means that
the model has not been finalized. Including such models in
our validation would have resulted in verification data difficult
to interpret. This gave us a dataset of 7 639 models with
reasonable quality assurances. From these models we selected
1 245 models with more than 5 BPMN elements. This is
because our focus is on collaboration, and 5 is the minimum
number to have a pool exchanging a message with another.
Considering our reference dataset, we perform a preliminary
transformation step from .json (the repository format) to .bpmn
(the format we manage), and then we check soundness and
safeness. Verification has been carried out on the above men-
tioned Virtual Machine located into the GARR cloud platform
(https://cloud.garr.it/). The machine runs Ubuntu 16.04.2 LTS
64 bits and it has 4 VCPU, and 8 GB of RAM.
B. Experimentation Results
To collect data we ran a massive analysis, checking if the
models satisfy the properties discussed in Section III-C. From
the 1 245 models, 1 026 (more than 82%) pass the parsing
phase, meaning that they include elements we consider in our
framework. This confirms that the selection of elements we
did allows to deal with most practical cases.
The main analysis outcome is described in Table I. The table
shows that only 55% of the considered models are sound.
In particular, this is mainly due to the fact that Option To
Complete and Proper Completion are satisfied by two different
sets, each containing 57% of the models, while the percentage
of models without dead activities is higher and accounts to
75%. In addition, we found that about 75% of the models
is safe. These results are emblematic in proving the need of
formal analysis techniques to verify the correctness of BPMN
models.
2Connectedness evaluates the size of the largest connected sub-graph
against the size of the overall model.
223
Fig. 5. BProVe User Interface.
TABLE I
FRACTION OF MODELS SATISFYING SOUNDNESS AND SAFENESS.
Property Models satisfying it
Soundness 566 (55%)
- Option To Complete 584 (57%)
- Proper Completion 584 (57%)
- No Dead Activities 772 (75%)
Safeness 772 (75%)
Table II provides more insights on the complexity of the
considered models, and on the time necessary to parse them.
In particular, we classified the models in terms of the number
of BPMN elements they contain (column Class). Column AVG
Elements provides the average number of elements of models
in the class, while column Time provides the average time
in milliseconds necessary to parse each model in order to
derive the format needed by MAUDE. As it can be observed,
the parsing time slightly increases with the dimension of the
model.
TABLE II
COMPLEXITY OF THE CONSIDERED MODELS AND PARSING TIME.
Class AVG Elements Models Time (ms)
05–10 7 487 244
11–20 15 366 277
21–30 24 120 326
31–40 34 42 388
41–70 50 11 925
Table III provides more information on the complexity of
the verification in terms of the time needed to check the
considered properties. In particular, for each class of models
the columns of the table report minimum, maximum, average,
and median time as well as standard deviation. Time values
are indicated as milliseconds needed to verify each property.
It is worth mentioning that the values observed for class
TABLE III
EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS (IN MS.)
(a) Option to Complete.
Class Min Max Avg Median Std Dev.
05–10 0 21 524 71 3 976
11–20 0 53 878 419 41 3 833
21–30 0 42 721 1 221 124 5 213
31–40 0 54 907 4 817 219 12 319
41–70 0 66 613 6 738 155 18 969
(b) Proper Completion.
Class Min Max Avg Median Std Dev.
05–10 0 25 496 218 19 1 620
11–20 0 63 741 1 666 150 6 083
21–30 0 41 461 3 661 786 7 913
31–40 0 77 605 9 068 742 18 089
41–70 0 240 035 22 578 588 68 775
(c) No Dead Activities.
Class Min Max Avg Median Std Dev.
05–10 0 5 802 61 2 295
11–20 0 523 742 5 473 225 39 921
21–30 0 477 232 13 647 1 554 52 296
31–40 0 877 553 59 765 1 860 159 123
41–70 0 303 632 29 555 606 86 744
(d) Safeness.
Class Min Max Avg Median Std Dev.
05–10 0 25 569 207 5 1 364
11–20 0 587 756 9 913 127 68 316
21–30 0 519 712 25 752 937 103 418
31–40 0 685 198 42 505 1 157 130 045
41–70 0 144 513 15 256 890 40 985
41–70 are not fully significant given the small number of
models belonging to such a class. Overall the observed data
shows that properties can be verified in reasonable time and
we were able to assess the properties on all the models in
less than 15 minutes. We also report the trend related to
the time needed to check soundness (Fig. 6(a)-6(c)), and
safeness (Fig. 6(d)). In the diagrams the time required by the
tool to verify properties is on the Y-Axis, while the class
of the models is on the X-Axis. The diagrams provide a
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(a) Option to Complete. (b) Proper Completion.
(c) No Dead Activities. (d) Safeness.
Fig. 6. Experimental Results
visual representation of some of the data reported in Table
III. Overall, we can observe that, as it can be expected, times
increase with the dimension of the models. There is also a
high variability justified by the rather high values assumed by
the standard deviations. This is not a surprise since, it is well-
known that verification activities are particularly affected by
the presence of notation elements leading to the interleaving
of activities, such as parallel or pool statements, that are
not always included in models. Nonetheless, the tool was
able to provide an answer in reasonable time also for the
most complex models in the repository. The analysis of the
maximum values observed for each class somehow tell us that
the maximum complexity of models, in terms of checking, is
rather independent from dimensional characteristics. Indeed,
as we also observed looking at the models associated to the
maximum values, modellers tend to reach a sort of maximum
complexity in the usage of elements leading to interleaving,
and such complexity can be easily reached defining a model
including 20 elements. Finally, considering the median values,
we discover that the used repository includes, for a large
fraction, very simple models. The value of the median is
indeed much smaller (up to 20 times) than the average. This
tells us that most of the considered models are rather simple
and that few models present real issues for checking.
Summing up and answering the research questions posed
at the beginning of this section, the usage of an open and
widely used repository confirmed that it is not seldom to
find models that violate relevant behavioral properties, also
after their release. In addition the experiments show that our
approach seems to be applicable in practice to realistic BP
models.
VI. RELATED WORK
Much effort has been devoted to the formalisation and
verification of Business Processes [24], [38], [39]. Neverthe-
less, none of the cited works takes into account at the same
time all the following key requirements: (i) enabling a direct
formalisation being close to the BPMN standard, thus avoiding
abstraction issues given by use of encodings; (ii) taking into
account the collaboration aspects as key features of BPMN
in large software development; (iii) providing a tool chain
suitable to enable soundness and safeness verification on real
scenarios.
In this section we refer to the most relevant tool-supported
approaches available in the literature that inspired our work.
We first consider the other direct formalisations enabling
formal verification, and then we discuss those approaches
supporting verification via encodings from BPMN to other
well-known formalisms.
A. BPMN Direct Formalisations
With regard to direct formalisations, our contribution was
mainly inspired by the one presented in [40]. The authors
propose a BPMN formalisation based on in-place graph
transformation rules; these rules are defined to be passed as
input to the GrGen.NET tool, and are documented visually
using BPMN syntax. With respect to our work, the used
formalisation techniques are different, since we consider an
operational semantics in terms of LTS, which allows us to
apply verification techniques well-established for this under-
lying model, such as model checking. The definition of an
operational semantics gives us the possibility to be tool inter-
dependent rather than be constrained to tools specific for graph
transformation rules. This is confirmed by the same authors
that, for using their BPMN formalisation in the compliance
verification between global and local process models, need
a further transformation [41]. Focusing on verification the
GrGen.NET tool aims to be used to verify workflow engines
and service orchestration/choreography engines using BPMN
[41]. The benefits of the solution are illustrated by means of
a simple scenario that showcases the approach.
Other approaches are also proposed considering direct for-
malisations. El-Saber and Boronat proposed in [42] a formal
characterisation of well-formed BPMN processes in terms
of rewriting logic, using MAUDE as supporting tool. They
discuss soundness of the well-formed BPMN models without
introducing verification into practice, which is postponed as
future work. This formalisation refers to a subset of the BPMN
specification considering elements that are used regularly,
such as flow nodes, data elements, connecting flow elements,
artefacts, and swimlanes. Differently from our approach, it can
be only applied to well-structured processes. Another direct
formalisation is that proposed by Borger and Thalheim in [43].
They define an extensible semantical framework for BPMN
using Abstract State Machines. It is based on the version 1.0
of BPMN, which does not include notation meta-model and
gives more freedom to the authors in the interpretation of
the language. Few years later, Kossak et al. [44] proposed
a semantics based on Abstract State Machines for BPMN
single process diagrams; differently from our proposal where
collaboration aspects, such as pools and message exchange,
play a key role, in [44] they are overlooked.
It is worth noticing that none of the approaches and sup-
porting tools mentioned above has been properly validated, so
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it is not clear which advantages and contributions they provide
on real scenarios.
B. BPMN Formalisation via Encodings
The most common formalisations of BPMN are given via
encodings to various formalisms, such as Petri Nets [9], [45],
[46], [47], [48], or their extensions such as YAWL [49], [50]
and ECATNets [51] [52], and process calculi [10], [53], [11],
[54], [12], [55], [56], [57].
Regarding the encodings from BPMN to Petri Nets, the one
proposed by Dijkman et al. in [9] is probably the most relevant
contribution. The Petri Net resulting from the encoding of
a BPMN model can serve as input to a Petri Net based
verification tool for the static analysis of the model. The
main contribution of the proposed tool is the transformation
rather than the verification. Indeed the tool has been validated
focusing on the transformation of only 13 models. The authors
just state that they detected errors in some of the analysed
models without giving details on effectiveness of the approach.
Moreover, the approach proposed by Dijkman et al. is based on
the version 1.1 of BPMN and, as the authors stated, it suffers
from deficiencies that impact on the proposed formalisation.
Moreover, differently from our approach, even if the encoding
deals with messages, it does not properly consider multiple
organisation scenarios.
Other relevant encodings are those from BPMN to YAWL, a
language with a strictly defined execution semantics inspired
by Petri Nets and able to support verification [19]. Among
the proposed encodings, we would like to mention the ones
by Ye and Song [49] and Dumas et al. [50]. The former
is defined under the well-formedness assumption, which in-
stead we do not rely on. Moreover, although messages are
taken into account in the mapping, pools and lanes are not
considered; thus it is not possible to identify who is the
sender and who is the receiver in the communication. This
results in the lack of capability to introduce verification at
message level considering the involved organisations. The
latter encoding, instead, formalises a very small portion of
BPMN elements. In particular, limitations about pools and
messages are similar to the previous approach: pools are
treated as separate Business Process, while messages flow is
not covered by the encoding. Focusing on supporting tools,
the two solutions permit to transform BPMN to YAWL Nets
enabling verification. Ye and Son implemented an open-source
plug-in called BPMN2YAWL that uses ILog BPMN Modeler
as a graphical editor to create BPMN models, and implements
transformation and verification as ProM 5.0 plug-in [49]. As
a proof of concept the tool has been tested using simple
models. Decker et al. also consider BPMN as source language
and YAWL as target language [50]. In this case, both the
transformer and the modeller are Eclipse plugins, while the
verification is supported by ProM 5.0. Again, as a proof of
concept the tool has been tested to a limited number of models.
More recently, Kheldoun et al. [51], [52] proposed an
encoding from BPMN to Recursive ECATNets, which can be
expressed in term of conditional rewriting logic and given in
input to the MAUDE LTL model checker. Even if we use the
same model checker, the approach in [51] suffers from the en-
coding problems discussed above and, in particular, it does not
consider messages in the encoding as well as the event-based
gateway. Moreover, the authors illustrate the approach through
three simple examples only, without extensively validating it.
Process calculi have been also considered as means for
formalising BPMN. Among the others, Wong and Gibbons
presented in [53], [10] a translation from a subset of BPMN
process diagrams, under the assumption of well-formedness,
to a CSP-like language based on Z notation using Haskell.
This enables the introduction of a formal verification to check
properties based on the notion of messages, like consistency
between BPMN diagrams with different levels of abstraction
and compatibility between participants within a Business Pro-
cess collaboration [58]. Benefits of the solution are illustrated
by means of a simple scenario.
Even if our proposal differs from the above ones, as it relies
on a direct semantics rather than on an encoding, it has drawn
inspiration from those based on process calculi for the use of
a compositional approach in the SOS style.
VII. CONCLUDING REMARKS AND FUTURE WORKS
Thanks to the wide adoption of BPMN, Business Process
modelling has acquired increasing relevance in the develop-
ment of software systems. This is mainly due to the capability
of BPMN to fill the communication gap between domain
experts and IT specialists. However, the lack of a formal
semantics prevents its full adoption, making unavailable the
automatic verification of relevant properties impacting on the
behavior of Business Processes.
Several approaches are available in the literature providing a
formalisation to the BPMN standard. In this paper we rely on
a native formal semantics for BPMN models, avoiding typical
problems due to the encoding in different formalisms, such as
the low accessibility of the analysis results.
Regarding verification of Business Processes, although the
research community provided many proposals, only few of
them are tool supported. Most of such tools are prototypes
resulting from research projects, developed just for demon-
stration purposes, and hence are rarely used in practice.
Validations on real case studies or wide model sets are also
not available. In addition some of the prototypes are not even
anymore maintained. In this paper, we presented a framework
provided with a mature and easy-to-use tool-support, which we
validated against more than one thousand models available on
a publicly accessible repository. The results of the validation
are reported and discussed in detail. Validation proves practical
benefits and effectiveness of the approach.
In the future, we plan to extend our framework to other
BPMN relevant characteristics, such as data management,
time constraints and resource allocation, so to enable also a
quantitative analysis for BPMN models. Finally, we intend
to evolve the prototype, now implemented in MAUDE, using
a “classic” programming language, so to further improve its
performance.
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